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1
INTRODUCTION
There are several competing approaches towards
appreciating nature and natural resources in the context
of climate change. The first can be termed
financialization, defined by the Oxford Dictionary as
the ‘process by which financial institutions, markets,
etc., increase in size and influence.’ The financialization
era can be traced from the 1990s, the same decade as
the market mechanisms were introduced in the Kyoto
Protocol, as will be clarified below. The emergence of
so-called carbon markets - encompassing a growing
derivative market, essentially rewarding the best betting
on future climate quota prices - has seen high profits.
On the other hand, even if there might be different
views on whether the carbon market has failed or
simply been ineffective in moving away from a carbon
economy, the many promises of  such carbon markets
have not materialized. Moreover, there is no likely
agreement on a global carbon tax or CO2 tax, and the
many forms of resource depletion continue with
inadequate tools to internalize costs.
The opposite approach is in this article referred to as
rights of Mother Earth and future generations. This
approach emphasizes strong obligations, making it
impossible to fulfill such obligations by utilizing the
various carbon markets.
Somewhere in between these two approaches, but
considerably closer to the financialization approach one
finds another approach, termed ‘Payment for
Ecosystem Services’ (PES). This approach
acknowledges as a problem that many of the resources
that are harvested are not registered and are hence  not
adequately recognized. A related problem is that many
harmful activities are not subject to any forms of
payment or compensation.
Encompassed in the PES thinking is the emergence
of REDD+ (‘Reduced emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation, and foster conservation,
sustainable management of forests, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks’). REDD+ has been
accompanied by the development of ‘safeguards’ by
the World Bank and other UN bodies, implicitly or
explicitly building on a human rights approach. Those
human rights that relate to the natural environment
have inspired the articulation of rights of Mother Earth
and of future generations.
These five approaches relate to various forms of
governance, whose central characteristics is the
participation of various forms of actors in the decision-
making process.1  Some of the approaches might also
be termed regimes; to the extent that they represent
‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actor expectations converge
in a given issue-area’.2 Hence, I use the term approach
for those norms systems that have not (yet) reached
the stage of a full-fledged regime.
There are other governance models or regimes for
natural resources management,3 which will not be
explored further. Moreover, the emphasis is on norms
development by states and intergovernmental
organization, not on initiatives by investors or
international multi-stakeholder processes involving
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2 Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’(1982)
36(2) International Organisation 1, 2.
3 David Humpreys, ‘Know Your Rights. Earth
Jurisprudence and Environmental Politics’(2015) 10(3-
4) The International Journal of Sustainability Policy and Practice
1 , distinguishing between rights of states, human rights,
property rights, and corporate rights; Sabrina Safrin,
‘Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological
Promise: The International Conflict to Control the
Building Blocks of Life’ (2004) 98(4) American Journal of
International Law  641, identifying global commons,
individual intellectual property rights, collective
intellectual property rights, and states’ sovereign rights.
1 Governance can be defined as 'the processes of
interaction and decision-making among the actors
involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation,
reinforcement or reproduction of social norms and
institutions’; see Marc Hufty, ‘Investigating Policy
Processes: The Governance Analytical Framework (GAF)’
in Urs Wiesmann  and Hans Hurni (eds), Research for
Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives
(Geographica Bernensia 2010) 403. On 405-407 he
specifies six requirements to be applied when studying
and analyzing governance processes: realistic (non-
normative); interdisciplinary, reflexive, comparative,
generalisable and operational.
corporations, investors and international non-
governmental organizations.4
The article’s overall ambition is to explore the strengths
and weaknesses of  conservationist approaches initiated
by states, alone or through intergovernmental
processes, by building on two theories. First, the
international regime complex theory,5  emphasizing
intergovernmental institutions. Second, the polycentric
governance theory,6  emphasizing that governance takes
place at different levels, and not only by states or
intergovernmental institutions.
The research question that this article seeks to answer
is: Can an offset or payment approach be useful in better
conserving natural resources, or does nature require a rights-
based approach, either a rights of nature, rights of future
generations or traditional human rights?
Two terms warrant further clarification. First, the term
offset refers to ‘an amount … that balances or
compensates…’7  Carbon offset describes payments
for greenhouse gas emission reduction measures
adopted by others, allowing the resulting emission
reduction to be included in one’s own emissions
account. There are also other forms of payments, as
will be shown below.
Second, the verb applied in the research question is
‘conserve’. Conservation refers to ‘[t]he supervision,
management and maintenance of natural resources;
the protection, improvement and use of natural
resources in a way that ensures the highest social as well
as economic benefits.’8  Hence, conservation is aligned
with sustainable development, specifying that there
shall be simultaneous improvement or at least no
deterioration in the three pillars -ecological, economic
and social. To preserve, on the other hand, is referring
to keeping something as it is. In other words,
preservation is considerably stricter, restricting the use
of resources.
2
INTERNATIONAL REGIME COMPLEX
THEORY AND POLYCENTRIC
GOVERNANCE THEORY
The regime theory from the 1980s, identifying principles,
norms, rules, and procedures,9  has been supplemented
by the regime complex theory, highlighting that the
institutional structure in given issue-areas has become
fragmented and decentralized.10  These institutions
have weak coordination and inadequate mutual
information sharing. However, by highlighting only
international, inter-governmental organizations, such
international regime complex theory misses out on the
other actors, operating on various levels in the realm
of civil society and the market.
Through identifying the role played by and the influence
exercised by these actors, the polycentric governance
theory provides an additional theoretical insight. It is
applied to identify the complex patterns of governance
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4 For a comprehensive analysis  analyzing various
initiatives, including the Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies (CERES), Investors Network
on Climate Risk (INCR) and Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI), see Philipp Pattberg, ‘The Emergence of Carbon
Disclosure: Exploring the Role of Governance
Entrepreneurs’ (2017) 35(8) Environment and Planning C:
Politics and Space 1437.
5 Robert O Keohane and Daniel G Victor, ‘The Regime
Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9(1) Perspectives on
Politics 7 and Kenneth W Abbott, ‘The Transnational
Regime Complex for Climate Change’(2012) 30(4)
Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 571.
6 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric
Governance of Complex Economic Systems’(2010) 100(3)
American Economic Review 641; Elinor Ostrom, ‘Polycentric
Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change’ (2010) 20(4) Global Environmental
Change 550; see also Elinor Ostrom and others, ‘Revisiting
the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges’ (1999)
284 Science 278, 279, specifying four models: open access,
group property, individual property, and government
property.
7 Bryan A Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary  1195 (9th edn,
Thomson Reuters, 2009).
8 ibid 347.
9 Krasner (n 2).
10 Abbott (n 5) 571. He notes that the regime complex
theory formulated by Keohane and Victor, (n 5)  is
more able to describe the present situation, with more
private sector initiatives and public-private initiatives, as
compared to the original regime complex theory,
introduced in 2004; see Kal Raustiala and Daniel G Victor,
‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’
(2004) 58(2) International Organisation 277.
of natural resources,11 increasingly in the context of
climate change.12
Abbott, in an attempt of bringing together international
regime complex theory and polycentric governance
theory,13 by the usage of  terms ‘conscious parallelism’14
and ‘orchestration’15 concludes: ‘Orchestration
provides a way to harness the benefits of
decentralization while minimizing the costs.’16
Orchestration should be provided by an international
body, proposed by him in the context of  climate change
to be the UN Environmental Program (UNEP).
Whether UNEP is adequately strong and has an
adequately encompassing mandate, is a question that
is not explicitly answered by Abbott, and when he
concludes, he rather applies the generic term IO
(‘international organisation’).17  Abbott argues that the
role of IOs should be to emphasize learning between
various regimes.
Keohane and Victor identify six evaluative criteria to
assess regime complexes, allowing for an identification
of how these regime complexes can be improved:18
(i) coherence, operationalized as the extent to
which the different regimes within the regime
complex are compatible;
(ii) accountability, operationalized as ‘the right to
hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge
whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities
in light of these standards, and to impose
sanctions if they determine that those
responsibilities have not been met’;19
(iii) determinacy, operationalized as clarity of  rules,
in order to enhance compliance;
(iv) sustainability, operationalized as durable;
(v) epistemic embedding, operationalized as ‘consistency
between rules and scientific knowledge’20;
(vi) fairness, operationalized as the adequate
distribution of benefits and not acting in a
discriminatory manner.
These criteria will be applied throughout the article to
assess the functioning of the various regimes and
approaches. One evaluative criterion will be discussed
under each section, highlighting one regime: (i)
coherence: carbon markets; (ii) accountability: human
rights; (iii) determinacy: REDD; (iv) sustainability: PES;
(v) epistemic embedding: carbon markets; and (vi)
fairness: Mother Earth. As carbon markets are
prevailing in international relations, carbon markets are
emphasized under two of the evaluative criteria.
3
COHERENCE: NORMS COMPATIBILITY
Are the various regimes within the carbon market
compatible? The requirements of being compatible are
that the norms do not conflict and can be complied
with simultaneously. While having compatible norms
is important, the underlying quality of the norms is more
important, as will be shown in the discussion below.
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11 Hege Hofstad and Jacob Torfing, ‘Collaborative
Innovation as a Tool for Environmental, Economic and
Social Sustainability in Regional Governance’ (2015) 19(4)
Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration  49,
distinguishing between hierarchical governance, market-
based governance and governance networks.
12 Ostrom (n 6) Beyond Markets and States; Ostrom (n 6)
Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action
and Global Environmental Change.
13 Ostrom and others (n 6). The polycentric governance
theory moves beyond the intergovernmental realm.
14 Abbott (n 5) 583, noting on p 581 that there are three
levels of interactions: nesting (hierarchical; Keohane
and Victor (n 5) 8 apply the term ‘semi-hierarchical’),
overlapping (non-hierarchical) and parallel (distinct issue
areas, not being part of a regime complex).
15 Abbott (n 5) 573, defining orchestration as ‘modest forms
of coordination’.
16 ibid 587.
17 ibid 588.
18 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 16-17.
19 Ruth W Grant and Robert O Keohane, ‘Accountability
and Abuses of  Power in World Politics’, (2005) 99(1)
American Political Science Review 29; another definition
emphasizes ‘the process of  using power responsibly,
taking account of, and being held accountable by,
different stakeholders, and primarily those who are
affected by the exercise of such power’; see Core
Humanitarian Standard (CHS), Core Humanitarian Standard
on Quality and Accountability 19 (CHS Alliance 2014).
20 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 17.
Two main types of  types of  carbon markets exist, the
regulatory or compliance market, to which compliance
is obligatory and the voluntary market. The voluntary
and the compliance-based schemesalso referred to as
‘cap and trade’, are performance-based. Any reductions
resulting from approved projects can be included in
the overall greenhouse gas reporting obligations of
states or corporate actors that have purchased quota
derived from projects.
There are a plethora of voluntary schemes. According
to the World Bank, it has established and is the trustee
of 15 funds termed ‘carbon initiatives’.21  All build on
the same logic of financing emission reduction projects
where this can take place at the lowest cost.
Among the compliance schemes, the largest among
the 21 Emission Trading Systems (ETS) established
so far22 is the EU’s Emission Trading System (ETS).
These are established in accordance with Article 17 of
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Due to the too high number
of quotas available on the market and the economic
downturn of  the European and global economy, the
prize for 1 ton of CO2eq in the ETS has in certain periods
like inlate 2016 and early 2017 been as low as 4 Euro.
The Kyoto Protocol includes two other market based
provisionsin addition to Article 17 on emissions
trading, namely joint implementation as provided for
by Article 6 (only for Annex B countries) and the Clean
Development Mechanismas provided for in Article 12
(for Annex B countries funding emission reduction
projects in non-Annex B countries).23 The emphasis
in the article will be on the emissions trading.
In addition to the market-based mechanism, there are
schemes primarily financed by contributions. As
specified by Article 9.8 of the Paris Agreement, ‘its
operating entities, shall serve as the financial mechanism
of  this Agreement.’ These entities include the Green
Climate Fund  based on contributions from states.24
The Green Climate Fund will also provide an important
funding device for REDD projects, as we will come
back to in Section 5 below.
How REDD+ might eventually be linked to the
market mechanisms of the Paris Agreement is still not
clarified, but the main funding of REDD projects will
in the foreseeable future come from bilateral
contributions and the Green Climate Fund. Moreover,
despite opposition by a broad range of organisations,25
the International Civil Aviation Organisation’s Carbon
Offset Reduction for International Aviation (CORSIA)
will provide for ‘carbon neutral growth’26 using 2020
as a baseline. Under CORSIA, any CO2eq emission from
international aviation that exceeds the 2020 level will
result in payments to climate change mitigation
projects, including REDD.
It can be argued that the self-funding cap-and-trade
system,  being at the core of the financialization
approach, - serves as a kind of  indulgence, allowing
one to continue omitting as long as one pays for others
reducing their emissions. It is wrong, however, to
assume that social and environmental concerns are
totally absent from the financialization approach.
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21 World Bank, World Bank Carbon Funds and Facilities (2014)
<www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange/brief/
world-bank-carbon-funds-facilities> accessed 3 April 2018.
22 International Carbon Action Partnership, Emissions Trading
Worldwide International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP)
Status Report 2018 2 (Berlin: ICAP, 2018).
23 For a collection of some of the critical reviews of the
CDM-funded projects, see Hans Morten Haugen, ‘What
Role for Human Rights in Clean Development
Mechanism, REDD+ and Green Climate Fund Projects?’
(2013) 5(1) Nordic Environmental Law Journal 51, 60-61n58.
; Kyoto Protocol Article 12.5(c), says that CDM shall
encompass ‘[r]eductions in emissions that are additional
to any that would occur in the absence of the certified
project activity.’
24 Established by the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change Conference of the Parties, Decision 1/
CP.16. (2011), para. 102. The objectives of  the Green
Climate Fund of generating $100 billion annually from
2020 seems most difficult to achieve.
25 Before the ICAO decision was taken in 2016, more than
80 NGOs opposed CORSIA; see <www.redd-
monitor.org/2016/04/04/more-than-80-ngos-oppose-
aviation-sectors-carbon-offsetting-plans> accessed 3 April
2018; for additional criticism, see Carbon Market Watch,
Visibility Unlimited: Transparency of the new aviation carbon
market <https://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Policy-brief.pdf> accessed
3 April 2018; for nine NGOs that jointly support CORSIA,
see <www.conservation.org/publications/Documents/
CI_Linking-Flight-and-Forests-Briefing-Paper-Apr-
2016.pdf> accessed 3 April 2018.
26 ICAO, What is CORSIA and How Does it Work? (2016)
<https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/
Pages/A39_CORSIA_FAQ2.aspx> accessed 3 April 2018.
Second, many projects should not have received
funding, as the emission reductions applications would
have come also in the absence of  CDM funding. 85
percent of the covered projects within the CDM have
been found to have a ‘low likelihood of ensuring
environmental integrity (i.e. ensuring that emission
reductions are additional and not over-estimated).’31
Hence, we see that while the norms within the carbon
market regime might be compatible, as viewed from
within the system, the rationale of these norms implies
incentives for producing highly potent greenhouse
gases, and funding for projects that should probably
not have been funded.
4
ACCOUNTABILITY: ENHANCED
COMPLIANCE
Are there in place norms systems setting out clear norms,
including sanctions if a designated body determine that
those responsibilities have not been met? The
accountability system is not well developed in most
areas of  international law, including in the realm of
international climate policies. Article 13 of the Paris
Agreement established an enhanced transparency
framework for monitoring states’ compliance with their
own ‘nationally determined contribution’ (NDC). The
two Bolivian Acts on Mother Earth, that will be further
elaborated upon in Section 8 below, includes an
accountability system through the Defensoría de la
Madre Tierra, but this office is still not mandated, as
provided for in Article 10 of the 2010 Act and Article
52 of the 2012 Act.32  In the current section we focus
on human rights, which has a developed monitoring
However, while human rights have been sought to be
applied in the context of CDM projects,27 human rights
criteria are hardly ever applied in the context of carbon
trade, as illustrated by the World Bank’s approach
towards eligible projects:
all renewable energy projects should be eligible
for carbon trade, regardless of the scale and size,
provided that such projects meet eligibility
criteria, are environmentally and socially
sustainable, and are consistent with applicable
domestic policies and regulations.28
Diversity in domestic policies and regulations implies
limited possibilities of applying a common standard,
both in the context of emissions trading and CDM
projects.29
Hence, if one accepts that cost-benefit calculations is at
the core of the carbon market, and also accepts that
states have highly diverse regulations to ensure
compliance with social and environmental standards,
there is a certain degree of coherence within this
dominant regime complex within climate change. The
low threshold for accepting projects as eligible for being
included in the carbon market is, however, a problem.
For the CDM, in addition to the highly diverse domestic
regulations, two main problems can be identified:
First, perverse incentives resulting from what is eligible
projects on the carbon market. Projects for destruction
of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which is a highly potent
greenhouse gas, constitute the largest share of the CDM
projects (28 per cent of all Certified Emission
Reductions (CER)),30  but unlike the EU quota system,
projects for the destruction of HFCs are still part of
the CDM. Allowing such HFC destruction projects to
receive CER has incentivised the production of such
HFCs.
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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27 Haugen (n 23) 59-63.
28 The World Bank, What Types of  Renewable Energy Projects
Should be Eligible for Carbon Trade? (2017) <https://
wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=FAQ#16>
accessed 3 April 2018.
29 As further explained by Haugen (n 23), the environmental
and social assessment of CDM eligible projects is done
by the so-called Designated National Authority.
30 UNEP DTU Partnership, CDM Projects by Type (2018)
<http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm>
accessed 3 April 2018; the share has been over 40 per cent.
31 Martin Cames and others, How Additional is the Clean
Development Mechanism? Analysis of the Application of Current
Tools and Proposed Alternatives, Study prepared for DG CLIMA
(2016) 152. Only two per cent of current CDM projects
have a ‘high likelihood’ of  environmental integrity.
32 Gabriel Díez Lacunza, Tras 6 años de la 071, aún no hay la
Defensoría de la Madre Tierra (2016) <www.paginasiete.bo/
nacional/2016/2/29/tras-anos-071-defensoria-madre-
tierra-88232.html> accessed 3 April 2018.
system but weak sanctions in cases of non-compliance
as compared to international trade or investment law.
This section will identify how collective right-holders
are recognized and able to have their rights ensured.
Some human rights must be exercised together with
others in order to be meaningful, for instance, the right
to take part in cultural life (Article 15.1(c) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, ICESCR). In addition to individuals,
there are four kinds of right-holders:
• families (Article 23 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR);
• members of minorities (Article 27 ICCPR);
• co-owners of property (Article 5(d)(v) of the
International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
ICERD);
• peoples, including indigenous peoples (common
Article 1 of the ICESCR and ICCPR).33
Common Article 1 of the ICESCR and ICCPR has
three paragraphs which recognizes self-determination
(i) in the context of political, economic, social and
cultural development, (ii) in the context of natural
resources, and (ii) particularly for peoples of non-self-
governing territories. It is, however, rights of individuals,
and not rights of peoples that are invoked in complaints
before regional courts and UN treaty bodies: the Human
Rights Committee (HRC) supervising the
implementation on the ICCPR, and the committees
for ICERD and ICESCR.34
While there are few examples of human rights playing
a decisive role in successful climate change litigation,35
such cases are likely to proliferate in the coming years.
The human rights of future generations also need to
be taken into account when policies and programmes
are reviewed with regard to their human rights
impacts.36
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACtHR) and the African Commission on Human
and Peoples Rights (ACHPR) has ruled in favour of
local communities by specifying the FPIC (free, prior
and informed consent) requirement.37 The most
common bases both for the IACtHR and the ACHPR
Financialization of Mother Earth
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33 The right to self-determination applies to indigenous
peoples, see the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP) (A/RES/61/295) (2007) Articles 3-4;
for a critical review of the right to self-determination
of indigenous peoples, see Hans Morten Haugen,
‘Peoples’ Right to Self-determination and Self-governance
Over Natural Resources: Possible and Desirable?’ (2014)
8(1) Etikk i Praksis / Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 3.
34 For an overview of some of the concluding observations
and court rulings, see Hans Morten Haugen, ‘The Right
to Veto - or Emphasizing Adequate Decision-making
Processes? Clarifying the Scope of the Free, Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC) Requirement’(2016) 44(3)
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 250 .
35 Urgenda Foundation v. Nederland, C/09/456689 / HA ZA 13-
1396, para 4.49-4.50 (2015), discussing the scope of state
obligations arising from Article 2 (right to life) and article
8 (right to family life) of the European Convention on
Human Rights <https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/
inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196>
accessed 3 April 2018, by applying the European Court
of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) Manual on Human Rights and
the Environment 2012, <http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Pub_coe_Environment_2012_ENG.pdf>
accessed 3 April 2018. The court ordered in para. 5.1 the
Dutch government to limit its greenhouse gas emissions
by at least 25% at the end of 2020 compared to 1990; the
ruling is appealed by the government.
Human rights, particularly the right to health, is invoked
in the Norwegian ‘Arctic oil’ litigation; see Greenpeace
Norway and Natur og Ungdom, Stevning til Oslo Tingrett 41-
42 (2016) <www.klimasøksmål.no/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/STEVNING-Endelig-uten-signatur-1810162.pdf>
accessed 3 April 2018. Drilling permits are alleged to
violate Section 112 of the Norwegian Constitution; see
<https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/english/
constitutionenglish.pdf> accessed 3 April 2018. The
plaintiffs have appealed to the Norwegian Supreme Court,
after losing in the local court.
36 The Norwegian Constitution, ibid, says that the right to a
healthy environment is to be safeguarded ‘for future
generations as well’. For other states’ legislations and
measures for taking into account the rights of future
generations, see Bridget Lewis, ‘Human Rights Duties
Towards Future Generations and the Potential for
Achieving Climate Justice’, 44/3 Netherlands Quarterly of
Human Rights 206, 221-225 (2016).
37 ACHPR, Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya)
and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois
Welfare Council) v. Kenya. 276/03 para. 226 (2009); in
para. 228 there is a direct reference to the Saramaka case;
see IACtHR, Saramaka v. Surinam. Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs Series C No. 172 para 134 (2007).
is their respective treaties’ provisions on property; see
Article 21.1 of the 1969 American Convention on
Human Rights and Article 14 of the 1981 African
Charter of Human and Peoples Rights.
The FPIC requirement is included in several provisions
of non-binding UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), with the strictest
wording in the provisions on relocation and storage or
disposal of hazardous materials (‘no…
without…[FPIC]’).38 In addition to these two
situations that are deemed to require FPIC, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) specifies
that the state has a duty to obtain FPIC in cases of
‘large-scale development or investment projects that
would have a major impact…’39  This ‘major impact’
requirement must be considered to be similar to the
first situation identified by the World Bank’s
Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) and the
World Bank’s International Finance Corporation’s (IFC)
Performance Standards (PS) as requiring FPIC, namely
‘adverse impacts on land and natural resources.’40 In
sum, therefore, there are four situations where a project
cannot proceed if no consent has been given by the
affected community or indigenous peoples: (i) major
impacts on land and resource access, (ii) relocation, (iii)
risks to culture, and (iv) risks resulting from storing of
hazardous material.
Hence, human rights treaties are increasingly applied in
the context of  conserving land and natural resources,
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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to few sanctions is a real problem41
5
DETERMINACY: CLEARNESS OF
RULES
How clear are the rules, understood as a specification
of the more general norms and are states approving of
the development of rules that take place through the
jurisprudence of international courts and practice of
the UN treaty bodies? Some of these new
interpretations have also influenced REDD+.
As seen above, the FPIC approach has been successfully
applied particularly in the Inter-American human rights
system. No legislation in the Americas has a FPIC
requirement, only a consultation requirement.42 Only
the Philippines’ legislation explicitly specifies a FPIC
requirement.43 Moreover, no human rights treaty
9
38 UNDRIP, note 31 above, Articles 10 and 29.2, respectively.
The other provisions, all of which apply the term ‘shall’,
are Article 11.2 (taking of property), Article 19 (measures
that may affect indigenous peoples) and Article 32.2
(projects affecting land and natural resources).
39 IACtHR (n 37) para 134 (2007).
40 IFC, International Finance Corporation, IFC Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability (2011)
< h t t p s : / / w w w. i f c . o r g / w p s / w c m / c o n n e c t /
c 8 f 5 2 4 0 0 4 a 7 3 d a e c a 0 9 a f d f 9 9 8 8 9 5 a 1 2 /
IFC_Performance_Standards.pdf ?MOD=AJPERES>
accessed 3 April 2018, PS 7, paras. 13-15; The World Bank,
The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (2016)
<ht tp ://documents .wor ldbank .org/cura ted/en/
3 8 3 0 1 1 4 9 2 4 2 3 7 3 4 0 9 9 / p d f / 1 1 4 2 7 8 - R E V I S E D -
Environmenta l -and-Soc ia l -Framework-Web.pdf>
accessed 3 April 2018, ch. 7, para. 24(a).
41 The Saramaka ruling by the IACtHR (n 37) has not been
adequately complied with, see CERD, Request to Surinam
(2012) <www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CERD/
EarlyWarning/CERD_Suriname.pdf> accessed 3 April
2018; and Association of Saramaka Authorities and the
Forest Peoples Programme, Request for Consideration of the
Situation of the Saramaka People of Suriname under the UN
Committee on the Elimination of  Racial Discrimination’s
Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures  (2013)
<www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/
2013/02/urgent-action-procedure-request-saramaka-
surinamefeb2013.pdf> accessed 3 April 2018. Surinam
reported on its response to these two requests; noting
the ‘complexity in implementing the judgment’, see
CERD/C/SUR/13-15 paras. 13 and 14 (2014), with CERD
reiterating its ‘serious concern about the delay … in
implementing these decisions’; see CERD, CERD/C/
SUR/CO/13-15 para. 29 (2015).
42 IACtHR, Kichwa Indigenous People of  Sarayaku v. Ecuador. Merits
and reparations Series C No. 245 notes 190-199 and 201-214 (2012).
43 Haugen (n 34) 251. The Philippines’ Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of  1997 (Republic Act No. 8371) says in Article
3(g) that FPIC: ‘[S]hall mean the consensus of all members
of the ICCs/IPs to be determined in accordance with
their respective customary laws and practices, free from any
external manipulation, interference coercion, and obtained
after fully disclosing the intent and scope of  the activity,
in a language and process understandable to the community.’
include a FPIC requirement. The only inclusion of
FPIC is Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169),
that specifies in Article 16.2 that relocation of indigenous
peoples ‘shall take place only with their free and informed
consent.’ Moreover, the basis for the judgments by the
IACtHR is Article 21.1 that applies the term ‘his
property’ (singular). It has nevertheless been interpreted
by the IACtHR to be exercised also as a collective right.
While space does not allow more examples, the given
examples illustrates the tendency by regional courts and
UN treaty bodies to interpret their respective treaties
beyond what the specific wording explicitly allows for.
REDD+ is a kind of PES, with more explicit
performance requirements and safeguard mechanisms
as compared to PES. Initially only termed ‘RED’, a
decision on reduced emissions from forests was made
at the Conference of the Parties’ meeting in Bali in
2007,44 resulting from the acknowledgement that
approximately 20 per cent of global greenhouse gas
emissions result from deforestation.
REDD+ is implicitly recognized by Article 5.1 of the
2015 Paris Agreement, recognizing carbon ‘sinks and
reservoirs’, including forests. Article 5.2 anchors all
existing REDD+ decisions taken by the UNFCCC
Conference of the Parties into the legally-binding
framework of the Paris Agreement and thereby making
REDD+ part and parcel of mitigation action. The last
part of Article 5.2 emphasizes the ‘integral and
sustainable management of forests’ as well as the ‘non-
carbon benefits associated with such approaches.’
REDD+ has developed associated safeguards, being
derived from binding and non-binding human rights
instruments. While the term ‘safeguards’ is not explicitly
applied in the Paris Agreement, the development of
REDD+ financial mechanisms have been accompanied
by an elaboration of such safeguards;  primarily through
as a result of  concerns that REDD+ measures might
be detrimental for indigenous peoples’ and other
forest-dwelling local communities’ access to and use
of the forests that will be covered by REDD+ measures.
Such safeguards were outlined by the 2010 Conference
of  the Parties.45 However, the World Bank’s Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) refers to the
‘safeguard policies of the WB as a minimum acceptable
standard’.46  Central to such safeguards is the so-called
Strategic environmental and social assessment.47
The 2010 COP safeguards and the World Bank’s
safeguards, adopted in 201648  scheduled to be operative
in 2018 stands  in addition to the IFC’s Performance
Standards (PS), operative from 2012.-49 The two
emerged independently of each other, and they are not
identical. The PS contains eight different standards, and
the ESF includes ten different chapters, with two last
and additional chapters covering financial intermediaries
and engagement. The structure and basic content of
the first eight chapters are similar between the PS and
the ESF, with some deviations, however.
When analyzing World Bank-developed safeguards, PS
7 and ESF chapter 7 on indigenous peoples are most
relevant. ESF has a wider scope, as it also applies to
‘Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved
Traditional Local Communities’.50 Hence, while the
term indigenous peoples is used below, it encompasses
African traditional communities.
The IFC’s PS and the World Bank’s ESF are the most
comprehensive standards, and the IFC standards are
applied by various actors involved in project financing,
constituting a much wider scope of application than
REDD projects. As seen in Section 4 above, FPIC has
a relatively weak embedding in international law,51 but
is increasingly applied in a number of voluntary
certification schemes. The World Bank and the IFC
require FPIC in three situations involving indigenous
peoples: (i) adverse impacts on land and natural
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44 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC-COP), Decision 2/
CP.13 Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries:
approaches to stimulate action (2007).
45 UNFCCC-COP, Decision 1/CP.16, Appendix I, para. 2
(2010), some expressing general concerns (‘reduce
displacement of emissions’).
46 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Common Approach to
Environmental and Social Safeguards for multiple delivery partners
(2014), 1, para. 2 <https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/
sites/fcp/files/2014/February/Common%20Approach
%20Fact%20Sheet_FINAL.pdf> accessed 3 April 2018.
47 ibid 2.
48 The World Bank (n 40).
49 IFC (n 40).
50 The World Bank (n 40) chapter 7.
51 For a more detailed analysis of the FPIC requirement,
see Haugen (n 34).
resources; (ii) relocation; and (iii) significant impacts on
cultural heritage, with a specification in the IFC PS 7
that this must be ‘critical’ heritage.52 Moreover, if
‘relocation is unavoidable the client will not proceed
with the project unless FPIC has been obtained as
described above.’53 This requirement applies, however,
only as long as the IFC is involved in project.
REDD safeguards identify particularly the rights of
indigenous peoples as well as forest-dependent
communities - if they ‘share common characteristics
with indigenous peoples and whose underlying
substantive rights are significantly implicated…’54
Another notable aspect of the UN-REDD Guidelines
is that they present the specific criteria of FPIC by
referring to a report from a UN workshop. The UN-
REDD Guidelines claim erroneously that the agreement
of this workshop has been ‘endorsed’.55
Hence, both the UN-REDD FPIC Guidelines and the
ESF of  the World Bank go beyond the wording of
international human rights treaties, including ILO 169
in the following ways. First, by including forest-
dependent communities. Second, by introducing FPIC
criteria from a workshop report. Third, by extending
FPIC requirements to African traditional communities.
This implies lack of  determinacy, but the development
is nevertheless important to ‘ensure that the
development process fosters full respect for the human
rights, dignity, aspirations, identity, culture, and natural
resource-based livelihoods…’56 The term ‘aspirations’
can be read as falling within the scope of the right of
peoples to freely pursue their political, economic, social
and cultural development, as recognized in common
Article 1.1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR.
Transformation of  land, irrespective of  whether it is
owned by or under customary use by indigenous
peoples, might potentially have considerable impacts
on greenhouse gas emissions.
The problems on the ground relate less to inconsistent
international norms, and more to inadequate domestic
implementation. A study of 23 REDD projects - in six
countries on three continents - has found that the main
problems - in ranked order - are (i) unclear tenure; (ii)
disadvantageous economics; and (iii) inadequate
governance.57 Another study identifies four types of
costs relating to REDD+ project implementation:
opportunity, transaction, implementation, and
monitoring costs, noting that much less is known on
opportunity costs from forest degradation as compared
to deforestation.58
Approximately half of these 23 REDD projects were
merely continuation of previous Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs),59
having a new labeling. Seeking to make the projects
more performance-based and document such
performance has implied a lot of time spent on
learning. Moreover, MRV (monitoring, reporting,
verifying) requires high-level expertise, acting without
the active participation of the communities. The large
CIFOR review of REDD+ finalized in 2015 was
cautiously optimistic about increased funding resulting
from the inclusion of REDD+ measures in a future
climate agreement.60 So far, there is no evidence that
the entry into force of the Paris Agreement in 2016 has
led to a greater interest in REDD+ funding among
governments and for-profit actors.
Therefore, states have been hesitant in approving the
development of rules done by international courts and
UN treaty bodies and in providing funding for projects
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52 IFC (n 40) PS 7, paras. 13-17; the specification is in para.
16; World Bank (n 40) chapter 7, para. 24.
53 IFC (n 40) para. 15.
54 UN-REDD Programme, Guidelines for Free, Prior and Informed
Consent 12 (UN-REDD Programme 2013).
55 ibid 18; for details, see Haugen (n 34) 271-272; see also
ibid 254n23 and 261n68.
56 IFC (n 40) PS 7, first objective; World Bank (n 40) chapter
7, first objective. Moreover, the IFC PS includes
references to human rights in PS 4, objective 2
(community health) and applying to business
responsibility to respect human rights, in line with pillar
2 of the UN Guiding Principles on business and human
rights (UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/31,
Annex (2011)); see IFC (n 40) PS 1, para. 3.
57 William D Sunderlin and others ‘REDD+ at a Critical
Juncture: Assessing the Limits of Polycentric
Governance for Achieving Climate Change Mitigation’
(2015) 17(4) International Forestry Review 400, 407.
58 Amy Ickowitz, Erin Sills and Claudio de Sassi, ‘Estimating
Smallholder Opportunity Costs of REDD+: A
Pantropical Analysis from Households to Carbon and
Back’ (2017) 95 World Development 15,23.
59 William D Sunderlin and others, The Challenge of
Establishing REDD+ on the Ground. Insights from 23
Subnational Initiatives in Six Countries, CIFOR Occasional
Paper 104 (CIFOR, 2015).
60 ibid vii.
In addition to better conservation, UNEP argues that
‘PES schemes offer a new source of income for land
management, restoration, and conservation…’65 The
overall PES approach is well placed within a ‘green
economy’, a term first applied in 1989,66 but gaining
world-wide attention during the 2012 Summit on
Sustainable Development wherein it  was  one of the
three main themes.67
Costa Rica has for many decades been seen as a modal
example in conservationist strategies.68 A study finds
that its national PES programme has become rooted
in the country’s conservation policy, been able to attract
funds from the ‘carbon markets’, provided income
for indigenous peoples and improved tenure among
small-holders.69 Other findings give reasons for
concern, however, as the participation in the PES
programs are predominantly legal entities, not
community representatives.70
PES projects worldwide have two main approaches:
asset-building or activities-restricting. The funding can
come from governments, for-profit actors and non-
profit actors. Two recent metastudies on PES found
that the different actors have distinct approaches
regarding what type of PES projects they do fund, that
user-funded projects are more efficient,71 and that few
that seek to preserve forests while ensuring the rights
of the indigenous and traditional communities
depending on these forests.
6
SUSTAINABILITY: ABILITY TO
ADOPT TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES
While the term sustainability is generally understood
as referring to improvements in the social, economic
and ecological pillar  for present and future generations,
the term ‘durable’ with the ability to ‘withstand shocks’
was chosen by Victor and Keohane when identifying
its core.61
Unlike the other approaches, the criticisms against the
PES approach has mostly gone under the radar. Is there
however, a need for better safeguarding elements in
PES projects?
The PES approach does not have adequate norms, rules
and procedures to allow for calling it a regime, but
several UN institutions have approved PES,62 presented
as a ‘beneficiary pays principle’.63 Unlike REDD-projects,
PES projects are not performance-based, but the
rationale is about valuing ‘services’ that are presently
under-valued: supporting (earth, plants, water, air),
regulating (cleaning up, sequestrating, pollinating, and
combatting diseases), providing (food, other plants
and genetic resources) and cultural-aesthetic (the non-
material dimension).64
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61 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 17.
62 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and UNEP,
The Value of  Forests – Payments for Ecosystem Services in a Green
Economy Geneva Timber and Forest Study Paper 34 (2014); UNDP,
Payments for Ecosystem Services <www.undp.org/content/
sdfinance/en/home/solutions/payments-for-ecosystem-
services.html> accessed 3 April 2018.
63 Ibid (UNDP) 1.
64 Norway is one of the relatively few states that have
commissioned a study on PES; see NOU 2013:10.
Naturens goder – om verdier av økosystemtjenester (Oslo:
Departementenes servicesenter 2013); for a summary, see
< h t t p s : / / w w w. r e g j e r i n g e n . n o / c o n t e n t a s s e t s /
c7ffd2c437bf4dcb9880ceeb8b03b3d5/en-gb/pdfs/
nou201320130010000engpdfs.pdf> accessed 3 April 2018.
65 UNEP, Fresh look-back at a Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES)
project in Uganda (2016) <www.unep.org/stories/story/
fresh-look-back-payment-ecosystem-services-pes-project-
uganda> accessed 3 April 2018.
66 David Pearce, Anil Markandya and Edward B Barbier,
Blueprint for a Green Economy (Earthscan 1989).
67 UN General Assembly, A/RES/66/288, The Future We
Want (2012), para. 12. The content of  a green economy is
specified in para. 56 to encompass: (i) poverty eradication;
(ii) sustained economic growth, (iii) social inclusion; and
(iv) maintaining the Earth’s ecosystems. The term ‘green
economy’ does not feature in the outcome document
from the UN summit adopting the 17 sustainable
development goals (SDGs); see UN General Assembly,
A/RES/70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development (2015).
68 Ina Porras and others,  Learning from 20 Years of  Payments for
Ecosystem Services in Costa Rica (IIED 2013).
69 ibid 62-63.
70 ibid 64. Four proposals for improvement are presented:
use simple indicators, develop impact evaluation tools, identify
impacts on social groups; and improve cost-effectiveness.
71 On user-financing vs. government-financing, see Sven
Wunder,  Stefanie Engel and Stefano Pagiola, ‘Payments
for Environmental Services in Developing and Developed
Countries’(2008) 65(4) Ecological Economics 834.
studies have assessed both the impact on social well-
being and the environment.72 A third recent meta-study
is more critical, and found no evidence of a ‘win-win’
(social and environmental) impact.73
Application of a PES approach in agriculture is
promoted particularly through governmental
funding.74 Farmers’ actions can both enhance and
degrade ecosystems.75 There are highly diverse approaches
to agriculture, from organic agriculture,76  via agro-
ecology,77 and food sovereignty approaches,78 to conventional
agriculture and industrial large-scale agriculture.79
On the face of it, PES might be most appropriately
applied in the context of  agroecology, which focuses
on ‘improving soil conditions … recycling …
integrating crops and livestock; diversifying … and
focusing on interactions …’80 These efforts must be
considered to be essential in a conservationist thinking
as defined in the article’s introduction.
In summary, as PES projects are non-performance
based and have inadequate sustainability criteria and
tools to measure sustainability outcomes  unlike
REDD projects, the future (durability) of the PES
approach will depend on the introduction of some
form of performance and sustainability criteria.
7
EPISTEMIC EMBEDDING: SCIENCE-
BASED POLICIES
In this brief section analyzing consistency between rules
and scientific knowledge, I will focus on the carbon
markets. In accordance with the logic of ‘cap and trade’,
there should be no increase in the emissions and the
most cost-effective burden-sharing is identified. Based
on what has been found in the review of the CDM projects,81
as well as the metastudies on REDD projects and on PES
projects,82 is there a need for totally new approaches?
Facts regarding emissions will be highlighted, as the
issues of cost-effectiveness were analyzed in section 3
above. The central premise of no emission increases
has not been met. It suffices to say that while
considerable amounts of funds have been invested
($4.6 billion in the voluntary market;83 $176 billion in
the compliance market84), the increase in global CO2eq
72 Driss Ezzine-de-Blas and others, ‘Global Patterns in the
Implementation of Payments for Environmental Services’
(2016) 11(3) PloS one  e0149847; note that three older PES
metastudies are referred to in notes 34-36; see also Gunnar
Köhlin and others,   In Search of Double Dividends from Climate
Change Interventions. Evidence from Forest Conservation and
Household Energy Transitions Report 09/15 to the EBA
(Stockholm: EBA, 2015).
73 Cyrus Samii and others,  Effects of  Payment for Environmental
Services (PES) on Deforestation and Poverty in Low and Middle
Income Countries: A Systematic Review, Campbell Systematic Reviews
2014:11 (The Campbell Coalition 2014).
74 Ezzine-de-Blas and others (n 72) 9
75 UNEP, Payments for Ecosystem Services in Agri-ecosystems (undated)
<www.unep.org/resourceeff ic iency/what-we-do/
sustainable-lifestyles/food-and-food-waste/payments-
ecosystem-services-agri-ecosystems> accessed 3 April 2018.
76 FAO, Meeting the food security challenge through organic agriculture
(2007), <www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/
1000550/index.html> accessed 3 April 2018. The report
referred to (FAO, OFS/2007/5 Organic Agriculture and Food
Security (2007)) is no longer available on FAO’s home page.
77 [Former] Special Rapporteur on the right to food, A/
HRC/16/49, Agroecology and the Right to Food (2011) applying
in para. 12 Altieri’s definition saying that agroecology is
the ‘application of  ecological science to the study, design
and management of  sustainable agroecosystems.’
78 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge,
Science and Technology for Development Global Report
10 (2009), defining food sovereignty as ‘the right of peoples
and sovereign states to democratically determine their
own agricultural and food policies.’
79 Arguments for large-scale farming approach are presented
by the World Economic Forum (WEF), Putting the New
Vision for Agriculture into Action: A Transformation Is Happening
(2012), noting, however on p 16 that large-scale land
purchases is ‘complex and sometimes controversial…’; a
similar approach is taken by WEF, New Economic Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and African Union
(AU) in their ‘Grow Africa’ initiative, launched in 2011.
The World Bank identifies ‘high risks’ and ‘lack of  success’
involved with large-scale mechanized grain farming; see
The World Bank, Growing Africa: Unlocking the Potential of
Agribusiness 88 (2013). All promote a multistakeholder
approach, involving NGOs, IGOs, ministries and corporations.
80 [Former] Special Rapporteur (n 77) para. 12.
81 Cames and others (n 31).
82 For the metastudies, see notes 57-59 and 71-73 above,
respectively.
83 Kelley Hamrick and Allie Goldstein, Raising Ambition,
State of  the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2016 (Forest Trends’
Ecosystem Marketplace 2016) 1.
84 Pietro Galgani, Carbon Finance for Safe Water Projects
(2012) <www.300in6.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
03/Carbon-Finance-Review-Report-FINAL-v2.pdf>
accessed 3 April 2018.
Law, Environment and Development Journal
13
emissions was  3.2 percent annually from 2000-2009,
after the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, while
the annual increase was merely 1.0 percent in 1990-
1999.85
Moreover, the EU Commission has found that those
installations participating in the ETS system have
achieved a reduction in CO2eq emissions of only 0.4
percent over five years86 and the reduction in annual
emissions resulting from the ETS has fallen since
2008.87 Despite this, the ETS is hailed as ‘the EU’s
flagship tool for tackling climate change…’88
There is much knowledge on what has real impacts,
but this knowledge has not led to policy shifts. Hence,
the scientific knowledge has not been of such a kind as
to overhaul carbon market policies.
8
FAIRNESS: ADEQUATE DISTRI-
BUTION OF BENEFITS AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION
To what extent can policies and projects for natural
resource conservation in the context of  climate change
ensure an adequate distribution of benefits and a
practical way to improve the living of the most
vulnerable communities and households? Human
rights have proven to have some impact on correcting
projects found to be harmful to indigenous peoples,
but only after the harm has occurred. Those that seek a
more comprehensive approach have called for Mother
Earth and climate justice approaches, both terms
recognized in the 13th preambular paragraph of the
Paris Agreement.
Two states have legislated in order to give legal rights
to Mother Earth: Ecuador through Article 71 of the
2008 Constitution acknowledging Pacha Mama, and
Bolivia through legislations in 2010 and 2012.
Moreover, both India and New Zealand have legislated
to grant rivers legal standing.89 We highlight the two
former states’ legislation.
Article 71 of the Constitution of Ecuador reads (extract):
Nature, or Pacha Mama … has the right to
integral respect for its existence… All persons,
communities, peoples and nations can call upon
public authorities to enforce the rights of nature.
The second paragraph includes a reference to ‘principles’,
recognized in chapter 1 of the Constitution,
encompassing ‘equitable redistribution of resources
and wealth to enable access to the good way of living’
(Article 3.5). It seems justified to term the Pacha Mama
approach in the Ecuadorian Constitution essentially
spiritual. Spirituality encompasses one’s relationships
with  oneself, others, nature and the transcendent ‘that
nurtures and celebrates wholeness’.90
So far, two Ecuadorian court rulings have explicitly
applied the rights of nature,91 both rulings finding
that a violation had taken place.
85 The figures are found at <https://www.green4sea.com/
wp-conten t/up loads/2015/12/Carbon-d iox ide -
emissions-from-fossil-fuels.jpg> accessed 3 April 2018.
86 EU Commission, COM(2017) 48 Final, Report on the
Functioning of the European Carbon Market (EU 2017) 34.
87 Ingvild Sorhus, Yan Qin and Marta Wroniszewska, EU
Emissions: What’s Happening in the Carbon Market? (2017);
figures from ‘EU ETS emissions 2008-2016, in Mt’
<https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/financial-risk/
commodities/eu-emissions-whats-driving-the-carbon-
market> accessed 3 April 2018.
88 EU Commission (n 86) 34.
89 Ashish Kothari, Mari Margil and Shrishtee Bajpai, ‘Now
Rivers Have the Same Legal Status as People, We Must
Uphold Their Rights’ The Guardian (London, 21 April 2017)
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-
professionals-network/2017/apr/21/rivers-legal-human-
rights-ganges-whanganui> accessed 3 April 2018.
90 John W Fischer, ‘Getting the Balance: Assessing Spirituality
and Well-being Among Children and Youth’ (2009) 14(3)
International Journal of  Children’s Spirituality 273, 275;
Rebecca Nye, ‘Identifying the Core of  Children’s
Spirituality’ in David Hay with Rebecca Nye (eds), The
Spirit of  the Child (2nd rev. edn Jessica Kingsley 2006)115.
91 I have not found the full text of the ruling by Esmeraldas
Provincial Court, 11 January 2017; see Julianne A
Hazlewood and the communities of La Chiquita and
Guadualito, Court Issues Ruling in World’s First “Rights of
Nature” Lawsuit (2017) <https://intercontinentalcry.org/
court-issues-ruling-worlds-first-rights-nature-lawsuit>
accessed 3 April 2018. For the 2011 ruling, see Wheeler v.
Director de la Procuraduria General Del Estado de Loja, Juicio
No. 11121-2011-0010 (2011) (30 March) <http://
blogs.law.widener.edu/envirolawblog/2011/07/12/
ecuadorian-court-recognizes-constitutional-right-to-
nature> accessed 3 April 2018; see also Erin Daly, ‘The
Ecuadorian Exemplar: The First Ever Vindications of
Constitutional Rights of Nature’, 21/1 Review of European
Community & International Environmental Law 63 (2012).
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Of  relevance is also the history of  the Yasuní national
reserve. A trust fund to be administered by the Multi-
Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF Office) of  the UN
Development Programme (UNDP),92  intended to
collect funds to preserve the Yasuní national reserve, was
discontinued by President Correa in 2013.93  This
decision also implied that the reserve was made available
to oil drilling. The attempt of  preserving Yasuní can be
seen as an example of  PES, but the Yasuní experience
shows that the Mother Earth approach has not been
adequately strong to provide for a new direction in
resource conservation.
Turning to Bolivia, the Law of  the Rights of  Mother
Earth (Law 071; originally ‘Ley de Derechos de la Madre
Tierra’) was adopted by Bolivia’s Legislative Assembly
in December 2010.94 Subsequently, in October 2012
the ‘Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral
Development for Living Well’ (Law 300; original: ‘La
Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para
Bien’) was adopted.
Article 4 of the original law gives a wide definition of
‘life systems’ and Article 5 defines Mother Earth as ‘a
collective subject of public interest…’ and declares both
Mother Earth and life-systems as rights holders.95
These rights are to be protected by the Defensoría de la
Madre Tierra, that is envisaged in Article 10 of the 2010
law and Article 52 of  the 2012 law, specifying that its
mandate must be specified by additional legislation.
However, the current multiyear strategy of  Bolivia’s
Defensoría del Pueblo says that it will protect the rights
of Mother Earth.96
We see that a holistic perspective is applied, but it is an
open question as to how this perspective can guide
decision-making processes. Moreover, unlike the
Ecuadorian case with two court rulings referring to rights
of Mother Earth, there are no rulings from Bolivia.
Bolivia authored the text of a 2009 UN resolution that
was sponsored by total 68 states,97 designating 22 April
as International Mother Earth Day.98  This is the peak
so far in recognition of Mother Earth.99
Hence, the Mother Earth approach - not being
adequately robust to be termed a ‘regime’ - has not
proven adequate in order to provide a policy framework
for the conservation of  natural resources. This does
not imply that strategies for climate justice are not
worthy of being further promoted.
9
COMPARING THE APPROACHES
This review of the five regimes or approaches has
revealed that there are some overlaps, most notably
between PES and REDD+ and between safeguard
measures and human rights. Moreover, the rights of
future generations has been sought encompassed
within human rights, but so far on a declaratory level.
The Mother Earth approach is still too distinct and
unique to interact with the human rights regime, but
92 The full name was ‘Yasuni Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini
Trust Fund’.
93 UNDP, ‘Over 20 Percent of  Yasuni ITT Trust Fund
Contributions Have Been Reimbursed’ (2014)
<www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/
articles/2014/02/26/undp-statement-on-decision-by-
government-of-ecuador-to-conclude-yasun-itt-initiative>
accessed 3 April 2018; see also Jonathan Watts, ‘Ecuador
Approves Yasuni National Park Oil Drilling in Amazon
Rainforest’ The Guardian (London, 16 August 2013) <https:/
/www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/ecuador-
approves-yasuni-amazon-oil-drilling> accessed 3 April
2018; see also Humphreys (n 3) 10.
94 For a translated version, see Law of The Rights of Mother
Earth (2010) <www.worldfuturefund.org/Projects/
Indicators/motherearthbolivia.html> accessed 3 April
2018.
95 The seven rights as recognized in Article 7 of the 2010
Act are: life, diversity of life (not genetically altered),
water, clean air, equilibrium, restoration (if affected by
human activities), and pollution-free living.
96 Defensoría del Pueblo, Plan Estratégico Institucional 2016-
2020 12 (2016) <www.defensoria.gob.bo/archivos/PEI-
2016-2020.pdf> accessed 3 April 2018.
97 UN General Assembly, A/63/PV.80, Sixty-third session,
80th plenary meeting, 2 (22 April 2009).
98 UN General Assembly, A/RES/63/278, International
Mother Earth Day, para. 1 (2009) (adopted without a vote).
99 The 22 April was celebrated as Earth Day before the
2009 decision on Mother Earth Day; the Earth Day
Network claims to be working with more than 50,000
partners, having one bill ion participants <http://
www.earthday.org/about> accessed 3 April 2018.
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human rights actors receive inspiration from the Mother
Earth approach. Hence, the term ‘conscious
parallelism’100 captures the fact that while these
approaches and regimes operate independent of each
other, there are interactions.
However, it is difficult to identify an ‘orchestrator’ in
these diverse regimes. One explanation is that there are
various ‘safeguards’ developed by various actors: the
original 2010 COP safeguards,101 the 2012 IFC’s PS
and the 2016 World Bank’s ESF,102 the 2013 UN-
REDD safeguards applying specifically to FPIC.103  As
specified by the World Bank’s Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility (FPCF), the World Bank’s safeguard
policies represent ‘a minimum acceptable standard’.104
A new approach to climate change mitigation project
planning and implementation must build on human
rights, either implicitly or explicitly. Some central
concerns that could guide this effort will be identified.
First, while the World Bank has contributed positively
to norm-setting overall, it does not have and should
not have any role in the development or monitoring
of human rights.
Second, environmental rights, that encompass FPIC
and rights of future generations, as well as
environmental obligations of states, does provide a
potential for a more holistic decision-making. In
addition to the three pillars of sustainable development:
ecological, economic and social, a fourth pillar has been
proposed: governance.105 Governance applies to
business actors as well, most explicitly embedded in
the due diligence approach, being about identifying,
preventing, mitigating and accounting for negative
human rights impacts106 as further specified in the UN
Guiding Principles on business and human rights.107
Third, extraterritorial obligations should be clarified
further. In the realm of ESC rights, such obligations
are specified by recognized scholars as applying to
human rights impacts outside of  one’s own state,
characterized by the exercise of ‘authority or effective
control … [resulting in] acts or omissions [with]
foreseeable effects …’108  The scope of extraterritorial
obligations is contested,109  but it should be noted
that only one human rights treaty (ICCPR) has an
explicit jurisdictional limitation. International
obligations are particularly explicit in the ICESCR
(Articles 2.1, 11 and 12) and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (Articles 4 and 45).
Fourth, the social pillar in sustainable development
must be operationalized to encompass human
rights.110  Those sustainability schemes that are
developed by industry alone in the realm of biofuels
include merely ecological criteria.111
Turning to the theoretical contributions that provided
the framework for this article, there no explicit human
100 Abbott (n 5) 583.
101 UNFCCC-COP (n 45).
102 IFC (n 40); the World Bank (n 40).
103 UN-REDD Programme (n 54).
104 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Common Approach to
Environmental and Social Safeguards for multiple delivery partners
(2014), 1, para. 2 <https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org
/sites/fcp/files/2014/February/Common%20Approach
%20Fact%20Sheet_FINAL.pdf> accessed 3 April 2018.
105 Helen Clark, The Importance of Governance for
Sustainable Development (2012) <www.undp.org/
content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/
03/13/the-importance-of-governance-for-sustainable-
development.html> accessed 3 April 2018.
106 Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Responsible business conduct for
institutional investors. Key considerations for due diligence under
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 8 (2017);
OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ch 4
para. 41 (Paris: OECD, 2011).
107 UN Human Rights Council (n 56)  paras. 17-21.
108 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Heidelberg: ETO Consortium 2013), principle
9; see also principle 12 on attribution of state
responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors.
109 To avoid accusations that extraterritorial obligations can
be used to justify interference in other states,
extraterritorial obligations should primarily be promoted
by states specifying requirements on domiciled
companies’ conduct wherever these companies operate;
see Olivier de Schutter, ‘Towards a New Treaty on
Business and Human Rights’ (2015) 1(1) Business and Human
Rights Journal 41,47 (2015).
110 OECD, Recommendation of  the Council on Common Approaches
for Officially Supported Export Credits and Environmental and
Social Due Diligence (the ‘Common Approaches’) (2016) 5,
defining social impacts as ‘adverse project-related human
rights impacts’.
111 Hans Morten Haugen, ‘Coherence or Forum-shopping
in Bioenergy Sustainability Schemes?’ (2015) 33(1) Nordic
Journal of Human Rights 1.
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rights references, however. When Victor and Keohane
apply their own evaluative criteria to assess regime
complexes, they are much more critical of the CDM
system established in accordance with Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol, compared to the quota trading system
established in accordance with Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol.112  Moreover, they are positive to the
REDD+ approach, but argue for a ‘diversity of
approaches.’113
Their article does not analyze PES explicitly, but based
on their positive assessment of REDD+ and the
potential for collecting funds from the carbon market,
it seems reasonable to conclude that they would endorse
PES. PES has its weaknesses and as specified above, in
order to improve PES projects there is a need for impact
evaluation tools, identifying social impacts.114
Eligible carbon markets under CDM projects merely
have to be ‘sustainable’ and comply with domestic
policies and regulations.115 These requirements, while
respecting state sovereignty, might imply approval of
bad-quality projects, due to improper assessment of
sustainability and inadequate policies and regulations.
The diversity within the carbon market projects makes
it difficult to apply Victor and Keohane’s evaluative criteria.
Addressing the group ownership theory developed by
Ostrom,116 the article has demonstrated that there is
an under-utilized potential for human rights to protect
the environmental rights in general and in the context
of indigenous peoples and traditional communities in
particular. An adequately broad consultation process,
FPIC or some other form of a rights-embedded legal
protection for communities should be part of a required
impact assessment or certification scheme approval.
It seems difficult to conclude that any of the approaches
or regimes specified above are able to change the present
course of the global community - that can be
characterized as a certain path towards an uncertain
future. The solutions are prohibitions, effective
dissemination of clean technology and a global CO2
tax that can shift patterns of production and what is
produced.117
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CONCLUSION
The article has studied a range of various existing
regimes and approaches. The analysis has sought to
identify their inherent characteristics, strengths and
weaknesses.
The still dominant approach involves payments and
offsets, with safeguard mechanisms being increasingly
applied, influenced by substantive human rights
requirements. By being included in the Paris Agreement
and the ICAO’s CORSIA, REDD projects might be
attractive for carbon offsets trading, but governmental
funding, bilaterally and through the Green Climate
Fund, are the present modes of  funding. The Mother
Earth approach is increasingly recognized and human
rights have been applied in the context of particular
communities, but primarily after the harm has occurred.
Human rights have influenced the safeguards developed
by various actors, including the World Bank.
The human rights approach has an underutilized
potential. Moreover, human rights of future
generations are included in some constitutions and
legislations,118  but not yet in a manner that has led to
court rulings affirming such rights.
112 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 15 arguing for ‘competition
between offset schemes…’; see also 17, arguing for ‘a
multitude of rules’ as this would be ‘effective’. On
CDM; see ibid 15, describing ‘dysfunctions of the
UNFCCC monopoly’ and the ‘poor administration’ and
lack of ‘cost-effective’ thinking within the CDM.
113 Keohane and Victor (n 5) 18.
114 Porras and others (n 68) 64.
115 The World Bank (n 28).
116 Ostrom and others (n 6), Ostrom (n 6); Ostrom (n 6).
117 On the proposed Carbon Fee and Dividend (CFD), Bibi
van der Zee, ‘James Hansen Rails Against Cap-and-Trade
Plan in Open Letter’ The Guardian (London, 12 January
2010) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jan/
12/james-hansen-carbon-emissions> accessed 3 April
2018. A recent survey in the USA showed surprising
support for the CFD: 67 per cent overall and 54 percent
among Republican voters were in favour; see Climate
Leadership Council, The Conservative Case for Carbon
Dividends 3 (2017), https://www.clcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/TheConservativeCasefor
CarbonDividends.pdf (accessed 3 April 2018).
118 Norwegian Constitution and Lewis, note 36 above.
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What is likely to shift states’ and companies’
assessments of their conduct might simply be the fact
that sustainable practices lead to lower overall risks and
higher returns on investments.119
The article has identified how international law
promoted by accountability mechanisms, only to a
limited extent influences national policy considerations
that are crucial for natural resource conservation.
119 Gordon L Clark,  Andreas Feiner and Michael Viehs,
From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How Sustainability Can
Drive Financial Outperformance (Smith School of Enterprise
and the Environment, 2015); this is a metastudy reviewing
200 studies, finding that 88 per cent of the companies
‘with robust sustainability practices demonstrate better
operational performance…’ than other companies.
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